







This paper considers the application of Ellison’s (2000) “Radius-
Modiﬁed Coradius” Theorem to models of evolution with state-dependent
mutations. A reformulated theorem is presented, with a crucial role
played by the most probable evolutionary paths between states. The
form of such paths is liable to change outside of the uniform mutations
case, with concomitant eﬀects on both long-run selection and expected
waiting times. An algorithm for ﬁnding these paths is oﬀered, and
used to conﬁrm the optimality of “step-by-step” evolution.
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11 Introduction
Since its inception in the works of Foster and Young (1990), Kandori,
Mailath, and Rob (1993), and Young (1993), the ﬁeld of stochastic ad-
justment dynamics has been a lively and controversial one. Perturbing the
deterministic population dynamics of evolutionary game theory with van-
ishingly small noise appeared initially to resolve the equilibrium selection
problem from a general boundedly rational foundation. Moreover, the stan-
dard uniform mutation rate models of Kandori, Mailath, and Rob (1993),
and Young (1993) (henceforth KMRY) - in which a player errs (relative to
the unperturbed model) with a ﬁxed probability " each period - reduced
the complexity of Freidlin and Wentzell’s (1984) Markovian graph-theoretic
techniques to simple “mutation-counting”.
However, such models were quickly criticised on the grounds that the
vanishing noise required for selection results implied unacceptably long tran-
sition times to “long-run equilibrium” (Ellison 1993). It was not until El-
lison (2000) though that general analytical results on transition times were
available; Ellison’s (2000) “Radius-Modiﬁed Coradius” Theorem not only
provided a new technique for characterising the long-run stochastically sta-
ble set of an evolutionary model, but also bounded the speed with which
evolutionary change occurs. The intuition behind the theorem is that “if a
social convention tends to persist for a long time after it is established and
is suﬃciently attractive in the sense of being likely to emerge relatively soon
after play begins in any other state, then in the long run that convention
will prevail most of the time”1.
Two new measures are employed to exploit this intuition. First, the
“radius” of the basin of attraction of a limit set (or a union of limit sets)
Ω, R(Ω), is deﬁned as the minimum number of “mutations” ("-probability
events) necessary to escape the basin of attraction of Ω. This radius provides
a bound on the persistence of the set Ω. Second, the “coradius” of the basin
of attraction of Ω, CR(Ω), is deﬁned as the maximum over all other states of
the minimum number of mutations necessary to reach Ω. This coradius can
be shortened by incorporating the eﬀect of “step-by-step” evolution: “large
evolutionary changes will occur more rapidly if it is possible for the change to
be eﬀected via a series of more gradual steps between nearly stable states”2.
To capture the increased speed of step-by-step evolution, a new measure is
computed by subtracting from the coradius a correction term which depends
on the number of intermediate steady states along the evolutionary path and
the sizes of their basins of attraction. This “modiﬁed coradius”, CR¤(Ω),
provides a bound on the attractiveness of Ω.
Using these two measures, the “Radius-Modiﬁed Coradius” Theorem
1Ellison (2000), p.18, emphasis added.
2Ellison (2000), p.19.
2shows that R(Ω) > CR¤(Ω) is a suﬃcient condition for the long-run stochas-
tically stable set to be contained in Ω, and that the expected wait until Ω
is reached in this case is O("¡CR¤(Ω)).
The aim of this paper is to consider the power of the “Radius-Modiﬁed
Coradius” Theorem in the face of another line of criticism of stochastic evo-
lutionary game theory, namely the arbitrariness of mutations occurring at a
rate independent of the current state of the system. Such “state-independent
mutations”, embodied in the ﬁxed mutation rate " of KMRY and others,
imply that players make mistakes (or experiment, etc.) with the same prob-
ability irrespective of the current strategy frequencies, and thus of the ex-
pected payoﬀs at stake. The eﬀect of relaxing this assumption is dramatic:
Bergin and Lipman (1996) demonstrate that, given any model of the eﬀect of
mutations, any invariant distribution of the “mutationless” process is close
to an invariant distribution of the process with appropriately chosen small
mutation rates. This implies that any strict Nash equilibrium of a strategic
form game is selected under some suitably chosen mutation model. Intu-
itively, when the mutation rates vary across states, the size of the relevant
basins of attraction is no longer enough to determine the long-run equilib-
rium; in particular, even though one basin of attraction may be smaller, it
may be “deeper” in the sense that mutations out of this basin are less likely.
Bergin and Lipman’s ﬁndings seemed to cast stochastic evolutionary
game theory into a wilderness of indeterminacy far worse than the one which
it had sought to escape. However, economically justiﬁed models of “state-
dependent mutations” still oﬀer the prospect of insight from the Markovian
selection tools, albeit at the price of greater complexity. And indeed, many
of the early results of the stochastic adjustment dynamics literature - most
notably the pre-eminence of the risk-dominant equilibrium in 2£2 coordina-
tion games - can be conﬁrmed in this new context (under certain conditions).
Particular models of state-dependent mutations doing just this include My-
att and Wallace (1998), van Damme and Weibull (1998), Lee, Szeidl, and
Valentinyi (2001), and Norman (2003). The most general analysis of the
role of noise in stochastic adjustment dynamics is that of Blume (1999),
who ﬁnds that the known stochastic stability results are preserved for the
(large) class of noise processes satisfying a certain symmetry condition.
Ellison’s (2000) “Radius-Modiﬁed Coradius” Theorem is framed using
the “"-cost” language of the uniform mutation rate model which Bergin and
Lipman (1996) so forcefully criticised. However, as Ellison notes, his model
“can easily accommodate state-dependent mutation rates with unbounded
likelihood ratios (as in Bergin and Lipman (1996))”3. In this context though,
the “cost” of a transition has a less clear interpretation; it still measures the
order of probability of the transition, but this can no longer be ascertained
3Ellison (2000), p. 21.
3by simply “counting mutations”. As a consequence, the application of the
theorem in models with state-dependent mutations is not immediately ob-
vious.
The present paper makes this application explicit by modifying the spec-
iﬁcation of noise in Ellison’s model, and hence reformulating the theorem in
terms of the underlying transition probabilities. The simplicity of Ellison’s
theorem is sacriﬁced somewhat in making this step, but the same fundamen-
tal lessons emerge. However, the reformulated theorem highlights the crucial
role of the most probable (or “optimal”) evolutionary paths between states,
and clouds Ellison’s “step-by-step” eﬀect on the speed of evolution outside
of the uniform mutations case. Nonetheless, an algorithm for ﬁnding the
optimal evolutionary paths is oﬀered, and used to demonstrate the contin-
ued optimality of “step-by-step” evolution. This serves to clarify the precise
sense in which Ellison’s intermediate “steps” must be “intermediate”.
The next section presents the essentials of Ellison’s model, modiﬁed
to emphasise the presence of state-dependent mutations. Section 3 then
presents the reformulated theorem and compares it with the original. El-
lison’s exposition is followed very closely in order to facilitate comparison.
Section 4 presents the optimal evolutionary path algorithm, and section 5
applies it to “step-by-step” evolution.
2 Preliminaries
Ellison’s (2000) model is unchanged, except that the parameter " and its
associated “cost” function are replaced by a general noise model g : R ! R,
in the sense of Blume (1999), which assigns choice probabilities to payoﬀ
diﬀerences. This is to emphasise the presence of state-dependent mutations.
Ellison’s (2000) Deﬁnition 1 thus becomes
Deﬁnition 1 A model of evolution with noise is a triple (Z;P;g($;¾2))
consisting of:
1. A ﬁnite set Z referred to as the state space of the model;
2. A Markov transition matrix P on Z;
3. A noise model g($;¾2) mapping payoﬀ diﬀerences $(z), z 2 Z, into
choice probabilities, given a noise variance of ¾2. The noise model
deﬁnes a family of Markov transition matrices P(¾2) on Z indexed by
the parameter ¾2 2 [0; ¯ ¾2) such that:
(a) P(¾2) is ergodic for each ¾2 > 0;
(b) P(¾2) is continuous in ¾2 with P(0) = P.
4The thinking behind the noise model here is that trembles from strate-
gies’ payoﬀs (i.e., noise) are generated by a random variable with cumulative
distribution function F, mean º and variance ¾2. This random utility-style
framework is intuitive for modelling evolution with state-dependent muta-
tions, but it is not entirely general. It cannot, for instance, generate the
standard uniform mutation rate model for every game (though it can for
any given game). Blume (1999) instead parameterises noise models by a
parameter ¯ such that the variance around the best response decreases with
1=¯. This too is not general, but it does include the most popular parameter-
isations of noise and noise reduction; the uniform mutation rate model and
the “log-linear model” of Blume (1993) and Brock and Durlauf (1995), for
instance, both ﬁt into Blume’s scheme. Nonetheless, the results presented
in this paper hold for either choice of parameterisation.
Now, property 3(b) in Deﬁnition 1 implies that the Markov process
(Z;g($;¾2)) converges to (Z;P) as noise vanishes (¾2 ! 0). (Z;P) is sim-
ply the deterministic dynamic deﬁned by the underlying game, the matching
mechanism, the rules for strategy revision, and the default behavioural as-
sumptions made of the players (most frequently best-response to some sta-
tistical frequency of play). The “recurrent classes”4 or “limit sets” of this
dynamic represent short- to medium-run equilibria of the system, and con-
stitute the candidates for its long-run stochastically stable set (Young 1993).
A given limit set of the unperturbed process (Z;P) is denoted L, whilst Ω
describes a union of one or more such sets. L denotes the union of all of
(Z;P)’s limit sets. The basin of attraction of Ω is denoted D(Ω), and is
given by
D(Ω) = fz 2 Z j Prob f9T s.t. zt 2 Ω 8t > T j z0 = zg = 1g
This is the set of initial states from which the unperturbed Markov process
converges to Ω with probability one.
Following Ellison, W(x;Y;g($;¾2)) will denote the expected wait until
a state belonging to the set Y is ﬁrst reached given that play in the ¾2-
perturbed model begins in state x. By examining maxx2Z W(x;Ω;g($;¾2))
when ¾2 is small one can address the issue of how quickly a system converges
to its long-run stochastically stable set Ω. Of course, W(¢) will in general
tend to inﬁnity as ¾2 goes to zero, but the speed of convergence can still be
judged according to how quickly the waiting times increase as ¾2 vanishes.
Heavy use will also be made of the following related notation. N(A;B;x)
will denote the expected number of times states in A occur (counting the
initial period if x 2 A) before the process reaches B (not counting the
process as having immediately reached B if x 2 B) when the process starts
at x. Meanwhile, Q(A;B;x) will be the probability that A is reached before
4Ω ½ Z is a recurrent class of (Z;P) if 8w 2 Ω, Prob fzt+1 2 Ω j zt = wg = 1, and if
for all w;w
0 2 Ω there exists s > 0 such that Prob fzt+s = w
0 j zt = wg > 0.
5B when the process starts at x (not counting what happens in the initial
period if x 2 A or x 2 B).
3 The Theorem
The previous section’s seemingly minor modiﬁcation to the noise mechanism
employed by Ellison complicates the resulting theorem considerably (though
not the underlying analysis, which is substantially unchanged). However,
it delivers a reformulation of the “Radius-Modiﬁed Coradius” Theorem in
terms of the evolutionary model’s transition probabilities, rather than its
“cost” function. This facilitates the application of the theorem in the pres-
ence of state-dependent mutations. The structure of Ellison’s presentation
is followed very closely in order to facilitate direct comparison. Hence, the
bulk of the analysis is relegated to the Appendices, where the Lemmas are
presented in the same order as in Ellison (2000).
Theorem 1 Let (Z;P;g($;¾2)) be a model of evolution with noise, L be
the union of the limit sets of (Z;P), L a single limit set, Ω a union of limit
sets, and fLjgr
j=i the limit sets through which the most probable path from
a given limit set Li to Ω passes. Then
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as ¾2 ! 0.
Proof. Following Ellison (2000), Lemma 1 in the Appendix presents
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6As Ellison notes, the numerator is bounded above by W(y;Ω;g($;¾2)), so
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8! 2 Ω (2)
Lemmas 2 and 6 in the Appendix contain these two results.
It is worth noting that it follows from Lemmas 2 and 3 that the time
necessary to leave the basin of attraction of a single limit set is W(l;Z ¡
D(L);g($;¾2)) » O(1=maxz2L Q(Z¡D(L);L;z)) for any state l belonging
to a limit set L.
Despite its notational complexity, this theorem has a clean interpretation
as the natural formulation of Ellison’s “Radius-Modiﬁed Coradius” Theo-
rem in a state-dependent mutations setting. To see this, note ﬁrst that
max!2Ω Q(Z ¡D(Ω);Ω;!) is just the probability of the most probable way




where (z1;:::;zT) is a path5, S(X;Y ) is the set of all paths from X to Y ,
and c(z1;:::;zT) is the “cost”6 of the given path. The radius R(Ω) is just
the exponent of " that gives the order of the most probable (“least cost”)










maxz002Lj Q(Lj+1;L ¡ (Lj [ Lj+1);z00)
maxz02Lj Q(Z ¡ D(Lj);Lj;z0)
¶
(3)
5A “path” from a set X to a set Y is deﬁned to be a ﬁnite sequence of distinct states
(z1;:::;zT) with z1 2 X, zt = 2 Y for 2 · t · T ¡ 1, and zT 2 Y .
6The “cost” function measures any given transition’s order of probability. In the
uniform mutations model, this involves simply counting the number of “mutations” ("-
probability events) required to eﬀect the given transition. Hence, a lower cost c(z1;:::;zT)
implies a higher probability "
c(z1;:::;zT ) for the required mutations.















In particular, maxz2Li Q(Z ¡ D(Li);Li;z) in (3) is the most probable way
of escaping Li’s basin of attraction, whilst each term in the product is sim-
ply the maximum probability of transition to Lj+1 divided by the maximum
probability of leaving Lj’s basin of attraction. Note that maxz002Lj Q(Lj+1;L¡
(Lj [ Lj+1);z00) is the analog of Ellison’s “minimum cost” of transition
from Lj to Lj+1, C(Lj;Lj+1) = min(z1;:::;zT)2S(Lj;Lj+1) c(z1;:::;zT). Since
maxz2Li Q(Z ¡ D(Li);Li;z) is the analog of R(Li) whilst maxz02Lj Q(Z ¡
D(Lj);Lj;z0) is the analog of R(Lj), the analogy between (3) and Ellison’s
modiﬁed coradius becomes clear.
Recognising these relationships, the parallel between the two theorems
is evident. Specialising to the uniform mutations model, the suﬃcient con-
dition for Ω’s long-run stochastic stability in part (a) of the above theorem
becomes "R(Ω) = o("CR¤(Ω)). This of course holds precisely when Ellison’s
condition, R(Ω) > CR¤(Ω), is true. For the waiting time in part (b), mean-
while, the expression in (3) is given by "CR¤(Ω) under uniform mutations, so
that the parallel is even more readily apparent.
Thus, unsurprisingly, the same basic lessons emerge from the reformu-
lated theorem as from the original. However, two novelties also emerge.
First, the eﬀect of “step-by-step” evolution is no longer immediately obvious
from the reformulated theorem; it is not clear whether any given intermedi-
ate limit set should be passed through in the “step-by-step” fashion. This
points up the need to determine the most probable evolutionary path before
applying Theorem 1.
Second, and relatedly, the most probable way of escaping a given basin
of attraction emerges as crucial for both long-run selection and expected
waiting times. In the uniform mutation rate model, “direct jumps”7 out
of basins of attraction are generally most probable; indeed, it is this re-
sult which delivers the simple “mutation-counting” approach of models with
state-independent mutations. In the state-dependent mutations setting, by
contrast, it is no longer clear that direct jumps are “optimal” in this sense,
further complicating the results of Theorem 1. This underlines the need to
investigate optimal evolutionary paths in general models of state-dependent
mutations.
7By “direct jumps” is meant just enough simultaneous mutations to move between the
two states concerned in one period.
84 An Algorithm
Finding the most probable evolutionary path from state 0 to a given state z
is a problem of combinatorial optimization.8 Let G = (V;P) be a directed
graph with set V = Z = f0;1;2;:::;Ng of vertices, where each arc ij
is weighted by the transition probability pij from the perturbed Markov
matrix P(¾2). This digraph is connected9 by virtue of the irreducibility of
the perturbed Markov process. Unfortunately, the longest path problem
for a cyclic graph is NP-complete.10 However, the optimal evolutionary
path problem can be turned into a shortest path problem by relabelling the
weights
aij = ¡logpij
This transformation allows the direct use of Dijkstra’s (1959) shortest path
algorithm on the transformed graph G0 = (V;A).
Algorithm 1 (Dijkstra (1959))
set u0 = 0 and set T = f1;:::;Ng
for k = 1 to N
set uk = a0k (and set P[k] = 0)
repeat (N ¡ 1) times
let l be a node k in T minimizing uk
delete l from T
for each k 2 T
if ul + alk < uk then set uk = ul + alk (and set P[k] = l)
return u0;u1;:::;uN (and P(0);P(1);:::;P(N))
Dijkstra’s Algorithm partitions the graph’s vertices into two sets, F
(ﬁxed) and T (temporary). Initially F = f0g and all other vertices belong to
T, and at each stage the nearest vertex in T is moved into F. Once the algo-
rithm has been run, u0;u1;:::;uN records the shortest distances from ver-
tex 0 to each other vertex. The “predecessor” array P(0);P(1);:::;P(N),
meanwhile, records where the various minima were obtained, and hence al-
lows the recovery of the shortest paths. The algorithm’s running time is
O(N2).
Proposition 1 Applying Dijkstra’s Algorithm to the transformed graph G0
delivers the most probable paths between vertex 0 and all other vertices in
the original graph G.
8Introductory texts on combinatorial optimization include McDiarmid (1997), Wilson
(1996) and Papadimitriou and Steiglitz (1982).
9A digraph is “connected” if it cannot be expressed as the union of two digraphs.
10An NP-complete problem is one that is as hard as any reasonable problem, in a precise
sense, and cannot be solved by any known polynomial algorithm (see Papadimitriou and
Steiglitz (1982), ch.15).
9Proof. The application of Dijkstra’s Algorithm to the transformed
graph G0 gives the path Uz of minimum “length”
P
(i;j)2Uz ¡logpij, for





(i;j)2Uz pij, the probability of the path from 0 to z.
In fact, as a consequence, the following simpler algorithm can be em-
ployed on the original graph G.
Algorithm 2
set u0 = 0 and set T = f2;:::;Ng
for k = 1 to N
set uk = p0k (and set P[k] = 0)
repeat (N ¡ 1) times
let m be a node k in T maximizing uk
delete m from T
for each k 2 T
if um £ pmk > uk then set uk = um £ pmk (and set P[k] = m)
return u0;u1;:::;uN (and P(0);P(1);:::;P(N))
Proposition 2 Applying Algorithm 2 to the original graph G delivers the
most probable paths between vertex 0 and all other vertices in G.
Proof. The vertex m selected on each pass when maximizing uk in


















where Uk is the path associated with uk for a given k.













































10which, given that l = m, is precisely the condition ul+alk < uk in Dijkstra’s
Algorithm.
Consequently, applying Algorithm 2 to G is equivalent to applying Di-
jkstra’s Algorithm to G0, and the result follows from Proposition 2.
5 Step-by-Step Evolution
As was seen earlier, when the “Radius-Modiﬁed Coradius” Theorem is refor-
mulated for a state-dependent mutations setting, it is no longer immediately
clear that Ellison’s “step-by-step” evolution is optimal. To see that it is, one
must identify the limit sets through which a given evolutionary path should
pass.
This question can be addressed by applying Algorithm 2 to the digraph
GL = (VL;Q) with vertices VL = L corresponding to each limit set of the
model, where each arc ij is weighted by the probability qij of the most
probable path from the basin of attraction of limit set i to that of j.
Deﬁnition 2 A limit set L0 is said to be intermediate between limit set L
and a union of limit sets Ω if
qLL0 : qL0Ω > qLΩ
Proposition 3 The optimal evolutionary path (as ¾2 ! 0) from a given
limit set Li to a union of limit sets Ω will pass through all “intermediate”
limit sets fLjg in a “step-by-step” fashion.
Proof. Applying Algorithm 2 to GL delivers a predecessor array with
P[Lk] = Lk¡1 for all “intermediate” limit sets Lj in the sense of Deﬁnition
2.
This result conﬁrms that, if there exist intermediate recurrent classes
(i.e. Ellison’s (2000) “steps” are in place), an optimal evolutionary path will
pass through each in a “step-by-step” fashion. Deﬁnition 2 also clariﬁes the
precise sense in which a recurrent class must be “intermediate” if it is to
constitute such an evolution-facilitating “step”.
Appendix
Lemma 1 Suppose (Z;P;g($;¾2)) is a model of evolution with noise. If
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11Proof. See Ellison’s (2000) Lemma 1 proof (with ¾2’s replacing "’s).
Lemma 2 Suppose (Z;P;g($;¾2)) is a model of evolution with noise and
that Ω is a union of limit sets of (Z;P). Then, for any !0 2 Ω and any












Proof. This is established in the ﬁrst part of Ellison’s (2000) Lemma 2
proof.
Lemma 3 Suppose (Z;P;g($;¾2)) is a model of evolution with noise and
that L is a limit set of (Z;P). Then,






for all l 2 L.
Proof. Following Ellison’s (2000) Lemma 3 proof, given L we can
ﬁnd a T and a k > 0 such that for any z 2 D(L) there exists a path
z = z1;z2;:::;zT with zT 2 Z ¡ D(L) such that the product of the tran-
sition probabilities along the path is at least kmaxz02L Q(Z ¡ D(L);L;z0).
Conditioning on the outcome of the ﬁrst T periods we have for any z 2 D(L)
that
W(z;Z ¡ D(L);g($;¾2)) · T+
(1 ¡ kmax
z02L
Q(Z ¡ D(L);L;z0)) max
z002D(L)
W(z00;Z ¡ D(L);g($;¾2))
Taking the maximum of the LHS over z00 2 D(L) gives
max
z002D(L)







Lemma 4 Suppose (Z;P;g($;¾2)) is a model of evolution with noise. Let
L be the union of the limit sets of (Z;P) and suppose L is a single limit set.
Then for any l 2 L,






12Proof. For each l 2 L let Sl be the set of values of ¾2 for which
W(l;L¡L;g($;¾2)) = maxl02L W(l0;L¡L;g($;¾2)). Ellison (2000, proof





Q(z;Z ¡ D(L) ¡ z;l)Q(L;L ¡ L;z)
¢
W(l;L ¡ L;g($;¾2))
· W(l;Z ¡ D(L);g($;¾2)) + max
z2Z
W(z;L;g($;¾2))
As Ellison notes, the ﬁrst term on the LHS of the expression is bounded
away from zero because Q(L;L ¡ L;z) is uniformly bounded away from
one for any z = 2 D(L). The ﬁrst term on the RHS is O(1=maxz2L Q(Z ¡
D(L);L;z)) by Lemma 3. The second term on the RHS is ﬁnite. It follows
from these observations that the desired result holds when ¾2 2 Sl. Taking
the union of these sets over all l 2 L, it holds for all ¾2.
Lemma 5 Suppose (Z;P;g($;¾2)) is a model of evolution with noise. Let
L be the union of the limit sets of (Z;P) and suppose that L and L0 are two
given limit sets. Then for any l 2 L,
1
Q(L0;L ¡ (L [ L0);l)
= O
µ
maxz2L Q(Z ¡ D(L);L;z)
maxz02L Q(L0;L ¡ (L [ L0);z0)
¶
Proof. In the proof of his Lemma 5, Ellison (2000) shows that for l 2 L
we have







fz1;:::;ztg \ (L ¡ L) = ;;




L0 is reached before L ¡ (L [ L0) and
at most jLj periods are spent in L j z1 = l
ª
where jLj is the number of elements of L.
As Ellison notes, the summation over t and l0 of the ﬁrst terms on the
RHS above is bounded below by N(L;L¡L;l). Meanwhile, the second terms
on the RHS are uniformly bounded below by kmaxz02L Q(L0;L¡(L[L0);z0)
for ¾2 small for some k > 0. Hence we have











Q(L0;L ¡ (L [ L0);z0)
¸ k0maxz02L Q(L0;L ¡ (L [ L0);z0)
maxz2L Q(Z ¡ D(L);L;z)
for some k0 > 0 using the result of Lemma 2.
13Lemma 6 Let (Z;P;g($;¾2) be a model of evolution with noise and sup-
pose that Ω is a union of limit sets of (Z;P), whilst fLjgr
j=i are the limit
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Given y 2 L ¡ Ω let z1;z2;:::;zT be the most probable path from y to
Ω, passing through distinct limit sets L1;L2;:::;Lr.
Writing q12 for miny02L1 Q(L2;L ¡ (L1 [ L2);y0) and W(A;B;g($;¾2))
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